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ABSTRACT
The security of Android has been recently challenged by the
discovery of a number of vulnerabilities involving different
layers of the Android stack. We argue that such vulnerabil-
ities are largely related to the interplay among layers com-
posing the Android stack. Thus, we also argue that such
interplay has been underestimated from a security point-of-
view and a systematic analysis of the Android interplay has
not been carried out yet. To this aim, in this paper we
provide a simple model of the Android cross-layer interac-
tions based on the concept of flow, as a basis for analyzing
the Android interplay. In particular, our model allows us
to reason about the security implications associated with
the cross-layer interactions in Android, including a recently
discovered vulnerability that allows a malicious application
to make Android devices totally unresponsive. We used the
proposed model to carry out an empirical assessment of some
flows within the Android cross-layered architecture. Our
experiments indicate that little control is exercised by the
Android Security Framework (ASF) over cross-layer interac-
tions in Android. In particular, we observed that the ASF
lacks in discriminating the originator of a flow and sensi-
tive security issues arise between the Android stack and the
Linux kernel, thereby indicating that the attack surface of
the Android platform is wider than expected.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.2 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection; C.1.3
[Computer Systems Organization]: Other Architecture
Styles—cellular architecture
General Terms
Android Security, Zygote Vulnerability, Cross-layer architec-
ture
1. INTRODUCTION
Android is the most widely deployed operating system for
smartphones and recent estimates [11] indicate that it will
continue to remain so in next years. Android is a Java
stack built on top of a native Linux kernel. Services and
functionalities are achieved through the interplay of com-
ponents living at different layers of the operating system.
Security in Android is granted by a set of cross-layers se-
curity mechanisms that collectively constitute the Android
Security Framework (ASF). The security offered by the ASF
has been recently challenged by the discovery of a number
∗Corresponding author
of vulnerabilities involving different layers of the Android
stack (see, e.g., [3, 7, 6]).
In this paper we argue that a systematic analysis of the in-
terplay among the different layers of Android is necessary.
To this aim, we provide a simple model of the interaction
among the components based on the concept of flow. Our
model allows us to reason about the security implications
associated with the cross-layer interactions in Android, in-
cluding a recently discovered vulnerability [3] that allows
a malicious application to force the system to fork an un-
bounded number of processes thereby making the device to-
tally unresponsive. The problem is due to the fact that
the invocation of a critical functionality offered by the Zy-
gote process (namely the forking of a new process) is not
restricted to the ASF by can be invoked by any application
(including malicious ones).
An interesting question is whether the problem is limited to
the Zygote process of if instead it is a more general issue in
Android. To ascertain this, we have defined and carried out
an empirical assessment of the allowed flows within the An-
droid cross-layered architecture. Our experiments indicate
that little control is exercised among the Android and the
Linux layers, thereby indicating that the attack surface of
the Android platform is wider than expected.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 in-
troduces the cross-layered architecture of Android; Sect. 3
presents the notion of flow; Sect. 4 illustrates the Zygote
vulnerability [3] and the associated malicious flow; Sect. 5
presents our experimental setup and results; in Sect. 6 we
discuss the related work and we conclude in Sect. 7 with
some final remarks.
2. THE ANDROID CROSS-LAYERED AR-
CHITECTURE
Android is organized into five layers: Application, Appli-
cation Framework, Application Runtime, Libraries and the
Linux kernel. The top four layers belong to the Android
stack while the lower one is a native Linux kernel.
1. Application Layer (A). It includes both pre-installed
(browser, email, . . . ) and Java applications installed
by the user. Applications are made of components cor-
responding to independent, yet mutually interacting
execution modules. There exist four kinds of compo-
nents: 1) Activity, representing a single application
screen with a user interface, 2) Service, running in
the background without interaction with the user, 3)
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Content Provider, managing application data shared
among components of (possibly) distinct applications,
and 4) Broadcast Receiver responding to system-wide
broadcast announcements coming both from other com-
ponents and the system.
2. Application Framework (AF ). It provides the main
services of the platform which are exposed to the ap-
plications through API. It contains the System Server
which is made of modules (i.e. the Activity Manager
Service and the Package Manager Service) which are
responsible of the proper management of the Android
platform. This layer also includes services for man-
aging the device and interacting with the underlying
Linux drivers (e.g. the Telephony Manager Service and
the Location Manager Service).
3. Android Runtime (AR). This layer contains the Java
core libraries and the Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM),
i.e. the runtime core component of Android that exe-
cutes applications. All requests invoked by upper lay-
ers and targeted to lower ones pass through the DVM.
4. Libraries (Lib). This layer contains a set of C/C++
libraries providing useful functionalities to the upper
layers and for accessing data stored on the device. Li-
braries are widely used by the Application Framework
services. For instance, the bionic libc provide supports
support for performing system calls to the Linux Ker-
nel and SQL Lite as provides the functionalities of a
relational DBMS.
5. Linux kernel (K). Android relies on a Linux kernel
for core system services. Such services include (1) pro-
cess management, (2) drivers for accessing physical re-
sources, and (3) support to Inter-Process Communica-
tion (IPC). Each Android applications are hosted in
a Linux process at this layer. Moreover each Android
application is assigned a specific Linux user. In this
way the standard access control model of Linux en-
sures that applications are isolated, i.e. sandboxing.
Physical resources are accessed by means of drivers
that are triggered through system calls. Applications
are not expected to invoke system calls directly; on the
contrary, proper services at the AF and L layers are in
charge of invoking system calls and provide the needed
services to applications.
IPC is carried out through a) an ad hoc driver named
Binder and b) Unix native sockets. The Binder driver
allows an application to communicate with other ap-
plications or Android services by means of message
abstractions called intents; sockets are files at kernel
level where upper layer components can put data in
order to share them with others. For security reasons,
communication through sockets is discouraged, albeit
not strictly forbidden.
Operations in Android are carried out through interactions
among layers in the Android stack. Such interactions consti-
tute the interplay of Android and are implemented through
different kinds of calls involving distinct subsets of layers
and libraries.
In the following, we provide a simple model of Android inter-
play sufficient for reasoning about its security implications.
3. CALLS AND FLOWS
Given an Android layer ` ∈ {A,AF,AR,L,K}, we indicate
with X` a component/module in the ` level. For instance,
AMAF indicates the Activity Manager Service in the Appli-
cation Framework. From now on, we refer to each element
able to communicate with others with the term component.
Interactions among components are carried out through a
variety of calls. According to the official documentation [2],
the following types of calls are available in Android:
• Binder call, binder(obj ). It is a call to the Binder
driver in the Linux kernel that allows inter-component
communications. A Binder call can be invoked by all
layers belonging to the Android stack (namely A, AF,
AR, and L) and it is directed to the Binder driver
in the Kernel. Then, the Binder driver establishes a
communication with the target component and deliv-
ers the serializable object obj to the destination. A
Binder invocation is made though an ad-hoc system
call, namely ioctl(). For example, an application
requesting a startActivity to the Activity Manager
Service will use a binder(startActivity(Intent)) call.
• JNI call, jni(mtd , obj ). A Java Native Interface (JNI)
call can be invoked by the Java layers (namely A, AF,
and AR) to access a C/C++ method mtd in layer L
using obj as object reference for the JNI call. For in-
stance, the Activity Manager Service uses
jni(getCallingPid, null) to get the process ID of the
application that is currently invoking its functionality.
• Socket call, socket(id ,m). A socket call is a direct in-
vocation of a Linux socket. It is normally invoked from
the AF and L layers. A bytestream m is delivered to
the socket id . For instance, the Activity Manager Ser-
vice can send a message M to the Zygote socket by
means of the call socket("zygote",M). Direct invoca-
tion of socket calls by applications is strongly discour-
aged (cf. [2]) although not forbidden.
• System call, sys(id , args). A system call is used to di-
rectly invoke a Linux native kernel functionality. The
AF and L layers are expected to directly invoke sys-
tem calls through functions in the bionic libc library
in order to provide services to the above applications.
For example, in order to create a new process the Zy-
gote library sends a sys(fork, null) call to the Linux
kernel.
• Function call, func(id , args). A function call is an
intra-component invocation that can be invoked in all
layers. For example, in order to determine if a given
component (represented by pid and uid) has a particu-
lar permission (i.e. android .permission.INTERNET ),
the Activity Manager Service can invoke the call
func(checkComponentPermission,P) that belongs to
the Package Manager Service. In this case P = {pid ,
uid , android .permission.INTERNET}.
• Dynamic load call, dl(id). It allows the A and AF
layers to retrieve a pre-compiled library (residing in
the L layer) identified by id . For instance,
GPSLocationProvider loads the GPS libraries through
the call dl("libgps.so").
Each call is invoked by a component and it is targeted to
another component residing in the same or in other layers.
Figure 1 shows the Android layers involved in the different
types of call.
Binder JNI Socket SysCall Function DynLoad
A
AF
AR
L
K
Figure 1: Potential sources (dots) and destination
(arrowheads) of Android calls
We indicate with X`
c−→ Y`′ the successful invocation of a
call c having X and Y as source and the target components
respectively. For instance, appA
binder(...)−−−−−−→ TelManAF de-
notes an invocation of the Telephony Manager service from
a requesting application app by means of a Binder call. Sim-
ilarly, appA
socket(id,m)−−−−−−−−→ ServiceAF means that ServiceAF
has received data m from appA on socket id .
A flow is as a sequence of calls apt to perform an operation
on the system. Common operations in an Android smart-
phone may be performing a phone call, access the media li-
brary, get the position of the mobile phone through the GPS,
to name a few. For instance, the flow that gives the GPS
position to an application App (cf. [1]) is: AppA
binder(...)−−−−−−→
LMSAF
func(...)−−−−−→ GLPAF jni(...)−−−−→ GLPL dl(...)−−−−→ GLL sys(...)−−−−→
KDK, where LMS is the Location Manager Service, GLP
is the GPS Location Provider (initially as AF service, then
with its native implementation), GL is the GPS library, and
KD is the corresponding Kernel Driver.
The concept of flow is key to reason about security-relevant
aspects of the Android cross-layer architecture [1].Unfortu-
nately, a systematic account of the legitimate flows is not
available in the Android documentation [2, 1]. For instance,
only three sample flows are provided in the official docu-
mentation. But these flows do not support a large part of
common smartphone operations, which are therefore carried
out through non-documented flows.
It must be noticed that the Android Security Framework
(ASF) can enforce security checks on the individual calls,
but it provide no support for checks encompassing an entire
flow. This may affect security: an operation can be exe-
cuted by a malicious component/applications by means of a
slightly modified flow which cannot be possibly recognized
as illegal by the ASF.
In order to give evidence of the security implications related
to flows, in the following section we describe a vulnerability
related to the launch of a new application in Android. The
launch of a new application is based on a flow which is not
formalized in the Android documentation. We show how a
modified flow can be carried out by a malicious application,
thereby witnessing the limitations of the ASF.
4. THE ZYGOTE VULNERABILITY
In Android, the launch of a new application requires the
creation of a new process at layer K, the instantiation of a
new DVM, and the binding of the process with the DVM.
In this section we describe the standard flow implemented
in Android for launching a new application. As show in [3]
a malicious application can exploit the lack of control in
the ASF to build a different flow that seriously affects the
performance of the smartphone. Due to the lack of controls
related to flows, the ASF has no means to detect and prevent
the execution of the malicious flow.
4.1 Zygote: the standard flow
When an application is launched a startActivity request
is sent to the Activity Manager Service, a part of the System
Server, by means of an intent. The Activity Manager Ser-
vice determines if the application has already an attached
process at the Linux layer, the K layer, or if a new one is
needed. The first case happens when an instance of the
application has been previously started and it is currently
executing in background; when this is the case the Activity
Manager Service gets the corresponding process and brings
back the application to foreground. In the second case, the
Activity Manager Service calls Process.start(), a method
of the static class android.os.process. This method exe-
cutes a socket call connecting the Activity Manager Service
to the the Zygote socket in order to send a command re-
questing the creation of a new process at the Linux layer.
The Zygote socket is checked by a proper service called Zy-
gote process that has the exclusive right to invoke the fork
system call at the K layer. Thus, the command to create
a new process is issued to the Zygote process through the
Zygote socket.
The Zygote process gets the command from the Zygote so-
cket and performs some security checks based on a built-in
security policy. If the checks are passed, a JNI call to the
function ForkAndSpecialize in the Zygote library is exe-
cuted. The command sent to the Zygote socket includes
a set of parameters. Some parameters are passed to the
ForkAndSpecialize function. The most important param-
eter is the name of the class whose static main method will
be invoked to specialize the child process. The Activity
Manager Service uses a static class (namely android.app.
ActivityThread) to specialize the new process with a stan-
dard DVM. In this class, a binding operation between the
Linux process and an Android application is attempted. If
no application is available for binding, the same class re-
quires to kill its containing process through a kill system
call to the Kernel.
If the spawning of the new process and the binding opera-
tion succeed, the Zygote process returns its child’s PID to
the Activity Manager Service.
The corresponding flow, depicted in Fig. 2, is:
ALA
binder(StartActivity(Intent))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ AMAF socket(ZSK,ForkCmd)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ZPAR
jni(FaS,params)−−−−−−−−−−→ ZLL sys(fork,∅)−−−−−−−→ KernelK[ sys(kill,self )−−−−−−−−→
KernelK], where the call in brackets is optional.
As stated above, the ASF does not check the entire flow.
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Figure 2: Standard flow for launching a new appli-
cation in Android.
On the contrary, checks are only performed on single calls.
In the specific case, partial security checks are made on the
invocation of the socket(ZSK,ForkCmd) on the ForkCmd
parameters but no checks are made, for instance, on the
identity of the invoking component.
4.2 Building a malicious flow
The Zygote socket is owned by root but has permissions 666
(i.e. rw-rw-rw). This means that any user process can read
and write on it and hence send commands to the Zygote
process. This choice is justified by the need of the process
hosting the Activity Manager Service (whose UID is stati-
cally defined as SYSTEM_UID, it is not owned by root, nor it
belongs to the root group) to request the spawning of new
processes. However, this has the unintended effect to enable
any process to ask for a fork. In terms of flows, this means
that the original flow can be modified and the corresponding
socket call can be made by any active component in the sys-
tem, instead of the Activity Manager Service as expected.
However, to avoid misuse, the security policy enforced by
the Zygote process restricts the execution of the command
received (i.e. ForkCmd) on the Zygote socket.
The policy prevents from (a) issuing the command that spec-
ifies a UID and a GID for the creation of new processes if the
caller is not root nor the Activity Manager Service, (b) cre-
ating a child process with more capabilities than its parent,
and (c) enabling debug-mode flags and specifying rlimit
bounds if requestor is not root or the System is not in “fac-
tory test mode”.
Only a few checks are performed on the (static) class used to
customize the child process: 1) whether the class contains a
static main() method and 2) whether it belongs to the Sys-
tem package, which is the only one accepted by the Dalvik
System Class loader. Unfortunately, these security checks
do not include a proper control of the identity (i.e. UID) of
the caller. Therefore each Linux process (and hence the as-
sociated Android application or service) can send fork com-
mands to the Zygote socket as long as a valid static class is
provided.
As show in [3], by using the System static class com.android
.internal.util.WithFramework it is possible to force the
Zygote process to fork, generating a dummy process which
is kept alive at the Linux layer. Such class does not per-
form any binding operation with an Android application,
thus Android mechanism that removes unbound new pro-
cesses (as the android.app.ActivityThread class does) is
not triggered.
In this way, all the security policies applied by the Zygo-
te process are by-passed, leaving a persistent Linux process
which occupies memory resources in the device.
The resulting malicious flow, depicted in Fig. 3, is:
MalAppA
socket(ZSK,MalForkCmd)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ZPAR jni(FaS,MalParams)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ZLL
sys(fork,∅))−−−−−−−−→ KernelK.
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Figure 3: A malicious forking flow.
Note that this flow completely by-passes the System Server
(and the whole AF layer) which is responsible for managing
the creation and destruction of new processes and applica-
tions.
4.3 Impact of the malicious flow
By repeating the malicious flow the Zygote socket can be
flooded by fork requests and this quickly leads to the exhaus-
tion of the resources. The ASF proves to be weak against
both the single and the multiple execution of the malicious
flow. In fact, no Android layer can detect the generation of
the dummy processes and then to intervene.
On the other hand, the creation of processes at the Linux
layer is legal since the fork operation is executed in kernel
mode. Thus, the ASF is unable to recognize such behavior
as malicious.
As soon as the dummy processes consume all the available
resources, a safety mechanism reboots the device. This is to
no avail. In fact, by forcing the execution of the malicious
flow during boot-strapping, it is possible to lock the device
into an endless boot-loop, thereby locking the use of the de-
vice.
Notice that to mount the attack, the malicious application
does not require any special permission, therefore it looks
harmless to the user upon installation. The attack has been
tested on a large number of emulated and real devices with
different Android versions and all of them proved vulnera-
ble. Further information on the testbed and results can be
found in [3].
4.4 Patching the ASF
The malicious flow differs from the standard one in two
parts:
1. The socket call to the Zygote socket is invoked by the
malicious application, i.e.
MalAppA
socket(ZSK,MalForkCmd)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ZPAR.
In the standard flow the Activity Manager Service is
instead activated by a request from the A layer, i.e.
ALA
binder(StartActivity(Intent))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ AMAF
socket(ZSK,ForkCmd)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ZPAR.
2. The optional system call for killing the unbound pro-
cess is avoided (KernelK
sys(kill,self )−−−−−−−−→ KernelK).
We have built up a patch for the ASF that prevents mali-
cious applications from invoking fork requests. Our patch
operates at layer K only by restricting permissions on the
Zygote socket. The patch takes advantage of the sandboxing
mechanism of Android, that forces each Android application
(except in very few cases) and service to execute as a sepa-
rate Linux user. The System Server is executed by a Linux
user with GID = system in all Android versions. Thus, we
changed the Zygote socket group from root to system and
reduced the access permissions from 666 to 660.
In this way, only socket calls coming from the System Server
are successfully executed, while others are discarded by the
Linux native permission system.
The proposed patch—which has been adopted by the An-
droid Security Team and it has been applied in version 4.0.4—
avoids the execution of the malicious flow by blocking the
possibility for an application to successfully execute a socket
call to the Zygote socket, allowing only legal calls from the
System Server. The patch works under the (reasonable) as-
sumption that the System Server is trusted. In this way, we
can also assume that the patch is robust against the second
modification of the optional kill system call, since the System
Server is expected to use the standard class for specializing
the child process.
The Zygote vulnerability witnesses the difficulties in assess-
ing the security of flows in Android. The ASF is unable to
relate different calls and tell apart malicious and legitimate
flows. To this aim, our patch is strong against the mali-
cious flow presented in 4.2 but it does not provide Android
with the ability to analyze flows and thus it could be of no
help when it comes to countering other potentially malicious
flows. Thus, we argue that the security assessment of flows
is an open security issue of Android and that the ASF should
be given the ability to analyze flows.
5. TESTING THE ASF ON CALLS
The Zygote vulnerability is basically due to a lack of control
on the identity of the components invoking calls targeted to
the K layer that are normally expected to be executed by
services in the AF layer. Successful invocation of such calls
by malicious applications instead of legal services in the An-
droid stack may potentially lead to other vulnerabilities as
the one described in Sect. 4.
As a first step towards a systematic analysis of flows in An-
droid, we carried out a empirical assessment on the calls to
the K layer (i.e. binder, socket and system calls, cf. Fig. 1)
with the objective to verify whether the ASF is able to recog-
nize whether that an execution of a call, normally executed
by legal services at AF layer, is invoked by a malicious ap-
plication.
To this end we modified both Android and the Linux ker-
nel in such a way to capture all binder, system, and socket
calls that the Android services in the AF layer normally in-
voke during their execution. Then, we implemented a tester
application that invokes the same calls (i.e. with the same
parameters) from the A layer. This allowed us to empirically
assess whether the ASF is able to discriminate between the
origin of calls, and, in case, to intervene.
As mentioned in Sect. 2, calls from the A and AF layers
should be mediated by the AR by the means of the DVM.
We set up a testing scenario into two steps: we implemented
1) a monitoring kernel module (MKM) able to intercept and
log system, socket and binder calls and 2) a tester applica-
tion that executes (from the A layer) the calls intercepted
by the MKM.
Both the kernel module and the tester application have been
developed and tested in an emulated Android device with
a Linux kernel goldifish v. 2.6.29, compiled with arm-eabi-
4.2.1 toolchain, and Android v. 2.3.3 and v. 3.2.
5.1 Building the monitoring Kernel module
Since the ability to load modules is disabled in the Linux
kernel of Android, we modified the kernel to enable this fea-
ture and recompiled it for a generic ARM architecture. We
then pushed the modified kernel module on the device and
installed it via the adb shell, using the insmod command.
Since the routines to be executed in response to Linux sys-
tem calls are declared in the sys_call_table structure, our
modified kernel module substitutes each entry in the table
with a custom routine. Such a routine gets the calling thread
name and process pid (using the Linux macro current) as
well as the optional parameters passed to the system call.
At the end of the custom routine, the actual system call
is executed. We use systemcalls.h for system calls proto-
types and unistd.h for system calls numbers.
The MKM offers two ways of logging: 1) writing on an ex-
isting system log or 2) writing on an ad-hoc char device. In
the former case, the MKM writes down logs on dmesg ker-
nel ring buffer. In the latter case, the MKM uses a custom
driver for a char device which supports open, close, read,
and write operations. During installation, the MKM creates
a new char device in /dev called sysCon and attaches the de-
vice to its driver. Once a call is executed, an entry is written
on the device by the MKM. In user space, applications are
able to connect to sysCon and retrieve data stored in it.
Our tester application, called SysCallTester, simply reads
the data written on the sysCon device and re-invokes the
system calls with the same parameters as the original one.
This application can also write parsed data in a text file for
permanent storage.
5.2 Testbed
We tested the MKM and SysCallTester on Android emula-
tors v. 2.3.3 (API 10) and v. 3.2 (API 13) using our modified
Linux kernel. On v. 2.3.3 we have developed a custom rc.
module script which is executed as a service in the init.rc.
The script installs the kernel module and acquires the data
written on dmesg every 30 seconds for 5 minutes and stores
them in a text file. The modification of the init file leads to
the creation of a custom ramdisk.img file for the emulated
device.
During the test execution, we repeatedly performed general-
purpose operations on the emulated device in order to force
the AF services to execute calls. Such operations include
the launch of a new application, installation/uninstallation
of applications, browsing, email-related operations and exe-
cution of random applications.
We logged a subset of the most representative system calls.
This set includes core system calls (e.g. for I/O and process
management), socket calls and binder calls (which rely on
the ioctl system call). It is worth noticing that the whole
set can be easily extended, adding the prototype of the new
system call in the MKM.
The automatic launch of the tester application has been au-
tomated using a BroadcastReceiver which intercepts the
BOOT_COMPLETED system message.
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Figure 4: The testbed
In our tests, SysCallTester and the MKM are executed at
the same time:
SysCallMonitor intercepts the system calls made by the
System Server, logging the data on its char device sysCon
as shown in Fig. 4. SysCallTester keeps monitoring the log
from sysCon and, as soon as a new system call is logged on
sysCon, it invokes its C++ library in order to re-execute the
system call, including the proper parameters.
5.3 Experimental results
Our experiments allowed us to empirically identify which
components in the AF layer invoke which system calls. The
result of our analysis is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: System calls invoked by services in the AF
layer.
AF service SysCalls
Alarm Manager getpid, ioctl, open
Activity Manager close, getpid, gettid, ioctl,
lseek, mkdir, open, prctl, read,
write
Audio Service -
BatteryStats close, exit, gettid, open
GpsLocationProvider getpid, ioctl
Location Manager
Service
getpid, ioctl, lseek, open, read
Package Manager close, getpid, gettid, ioctl,
lstat64, open, sendmsg, write
Power Manager Ser-
vice
getpid, ioctl, open, read, write
ServerThread close, connect, getpid, get-
tid, ioctl, lseek, lstat64, open,
prctl, read, recvmsg, sendmsg,
sendto, socket, write
ThrottleService close, exit_group, getpid, get-
tid, ioctl, open, prctl, read,
sendmsg, write
VoldConnector getpid, gettid, ioctl, open,
recvmsg, write
Window Manager close, getpid, gettid, ioctl,
open, read, write
Moreover, in order to check whether the ASF is able to
discriminate between different callers of the same instance
of the call, we have re-executed through SysCallTester
(invoked 50 times) the following system calls as soon as
they were executed by the legal service in the AF layer:
bind, close, connect, exit_group, exit, getpid, gettid,
kill, ioctl, lseek, lstat64, mkdir, open, prctl, read,
recvfrom, recvmsg, sendmsg, sendto, socket, write.
SysCallTester was able to re-execute properly the 85% of
the intercepted system calls (18 out of 21), both on An-
droid v. 2.3.3 and v. 3.2. Only three calls systematically
fail (i.e. bind, kill, and sendto). This is due to unac-
cepted parameters: bind fails because the targeted socket
is already bound, kill fails because it is not possible for a
normal user to kill another process except itself, and sendto
cannot be executed because another endpoint is already con-
nected. Our experiments indicate that little control is exer-
cised among the Android layers (A, AF, AR and L) and the
Linux layer (K) regarding system, socket and binder calls.
The System Server is, from a kernel point of view, a normal
Linux user since it has no root privileges. For this reason,
the Linux kernel is not able to discriminate System Server
calls from those invoked by another Linux user (e.g. a rogue
application) let alone to counter them. The ASF is also ap-
parently unable to discriminate the callers of a call, thus
potentially permitting malicious flows as it is the case of the
Zygote vulnerability).
6. RELATED WORK
Android security is an emerging research field, in particular
due to the fact that user personal data are managed on a
device that is generally kept continuously connected to the
Internet. Current literature is mainly devoted to propose
solution for assessing/improving the privacy/security of the
end-user by means of i) static analysis on the compliance of
Android applications against expected security properties
[8], [9], [10], ii) enhancements for ASF (and related security
policy) [5, 6], and iii) detection of vulnerabilities and secu-
rity threats [3, 4].
Independently from the final aim, some proposals directly or
indirectly deal with Android calls. For example, approaches
based on static analysis indirectly deal with cross-layer calls.
In [8], a horizontal study of Android applications aimed at
discovering stealing of personal data is performed. Besides,
in [9] a black-box analysis tool (Stowaway) for inferring over-
privilege in compiled Android applications is proposed, while
in [10] a tool (Scandroid) for automatically reasoning about
the security of Android applications is discussed. In particu-
lar, Scandroid takes into account interactions between appli-
cations. Enhancements of native ASF are mostly aimed at
improving the management and the granularity of the native
Android permission system. In particular, in [12] a policy
enforcement framework (Apex) allows the end user to selec-
tively grant permissions to the applications. In [13] a modi-
fied infrastructure (SAINT) aimed at managing install-time
permissions assignment is proposed. [4] proposes a security
framework (XManDroid) that extends the native monitoring
mechanism of Android to detect privilege escalation attacks.
However, none of such solutions, albeit dealing with Android
calls, takes into consideration interplay between the Android
stack and the Linux kernel, focusing attention only on invo-
cations related to the Android layers. Furthermore, no pro-
posal deal with the idea of flow nor it assesses the impact of
cross-layer flows on the security of Android. To the best of
our knowledge, our work is the first attempt to investigate
correlations and security issues related to the interplay in
the whole Android architecture.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have discussed security issues related to
interplay in Android platforms and provided a preliminary
assessment of the security implications related to the cross-
layer interplay of the Android components. We have showed
that attacks to the security of Android may be driven by ma-
licious applications and that the ASF as well as the native
security mechanisms at the Linux layer may be not sufficient
to discriminate between the caller of an invocation. Such a
scenario may lead to vulnerabilities whose exploitation by
malicious applications may go undetected as it is the case
for the Zygote vulnerability.
To support our observations we have developed 1) a kernel
module that logs system calls invoked by AF layer and 2)
a tester application capable to read the logs and re-execute
successfully the tracked calls. Our experiments indicate that
little control is exercised among the Android and the Linux
layers, thereby indicating that the attack surface of the An-
droid platform is wider than expected.
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